Inching Towards Harmonization: Immigration Controls Along the Canada-United States Border, 1882-1910 by Matieyshen, Cory
University of Lethbridge Research Repository
OPUS http://opus.uleth.ca
Undergraduate Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal (LURJ)
2008-06
Inching Towards Harmonization:
Immigration Controls Along the
Canada-United States Border, 1882-1910
Matieyshen, Cory
Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal
http://hdl.handle.net/10133/1212
Downloaded from University of Lethbridge Research Repository, OPUS
Home | Current Issue | Editorial Board | Instructions for Authors | Contact
Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal
ISSN 1718-8482
Inching Towards Harmonization:
Immigration Controls Along the Canada-United States Border, 1882-1910
Cory Matieyshen 
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Citation:
Cory Matieyshen: Inching Towards Harmonization: Immigration Controls Along the Canada-United States Border,
1882-1910. Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal. 2008. Volume 3 Number 2.
Abstract
After Congress banned most Chinese immigrants and certain classes of other immigrants in the 1880s and 1890s,
immigrants who would have been turned away at American seaports began landing in Canada and crossing the land
border. Immigrants proved adept at evading American immigration officials assigned to Canadian seaports and certain
points along the border, leading the United States to monitor the entire international border by 1908. Between 1905
and 1910, Canada stationed immigration officers at both American seaports and along the border and passed
immigration laws that were essentially identical to those in effect in the United States, making it more difficult to use
one country as a "back door" to the other. Using Canadian archival sources, this paper shows that even before Frank
Oliver overhauled Canada's immigration law and enforcement regime the Canadian government made several key
concessions designed to mollify the Americans and protect Canada's transportation industry.
During the 1880s and 1890s, United States-bound immigrants who would have been excluded at American seaports
landed in Canada, passed Canada's limited inspection, then entered the United States along the largely unmonitored
international border. Congress failed to negotiate a treaty calling on Canada to intercept Chinese immigrants attempting to
enter the United States as a prelude to an American-style exclusion policy. The Americans were more successful in their
efforts to get Canada to allow the United States to inspect American-bound immigrants at Canadian seaports, but soon
found that immigrants could easily bypass their inspectors by claiming to be bound for Canada. In 1903, Canada increased
its Chinese head tax to $500 and the transportation company that carried most of the Chinese passenger traffic to Canada
agreed to inspect immigrants before they left China, but both measures proved ineffective, leading the United States to
close its land border to Chinese immigrants in 1910. Canada made limited but important concessions concerning
non-Chinese immigrants, including passing legislation explicitly designed to help the United States deport non-quarantinable
diseased immigrants, but as of 1903 Canada's list of excludable immigrants still did not match the American list from the
1880s, much less the expanded list included in the Immigration Act of 1903. American policymakers concluded that direct
border enforcement was needed to supplement their inspections at Canada's seaports around the same time as Canada
began to accept the need for a more selective immigration policy. By 1910, Canada and the United States used similar
methods to enforce essentially identical immigration policies at their ports of entry, making it considerably more difficult to
avoid one country's immigration inspectors by entering through the other.
From its colonial beginnings to the 1870s, the United States placed few restrictions on immigration. A perennial
shortage of workers in the United States made the free movement of labour essential to American economic development,
resulting in immigration laws aimed at increasing, rather than restricting, foreign immigration. After the Union-Pacific
Railroad was completed in 1869, the demand for one group of labourers, the Chinese, declined drastically, leading to racial
tension when 10,000 Chinese railroad workers joined the California labour force. The following year, a Massachusetts
employer hired Chinese labourers as strikebreakers, leading the broader labour movement in the United States to abandon
its pro-immigrant stance. The combination of economic competition, the belief that the Chinese were racially inferior and
could never be assimilated, and the fear that a large Chinese “army” would overrun the United States if given the chance
led to mass social and legal discrimination and, at times, violent racial attacks against Chinese-Americans. 1
While politicians in the United States were prepared to restrict Chinese immigration in the 1870s, the Burlingame Treaty
of 1868 between the United States and China affirmed the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and
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allegiance.” 2 As a result, the only classes of Chinese immigrants affected by the Page Act of 1875 were prostitutes and
individuals convicted of non-political crimes. Once the Burlingame Treaty was revised in 1881, however, Congress had the
unilateral right to restrict or even suspend the immigration of Chinese labourers. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
prohibited the entry of Chinese labourers of all skill levels for a 10-year period. For the first time in American history, an
immigrant group was legally barred on the basis of race and class, making Chinese labourers who entered the United
States by evading American customs officials America's first illegal immigrants. 3
The restrictions in place at American seaports led a number of Chinese immigrants to enter the United States via
Canada after 1882, legally at first, then illegally. Canada's need for labourers to complete the Canadian Pacific Railway
(CPR) led the federal government to place few restrictions on the immigration of Chinese labourers. In addition, rulings by
American federal courts stated that the exclusion laws only applied to Chinese who came directly to the United States from
China, not those who came through another country. When combined with the good transportation links between Asia and
British Columbia with further links to the United States, these factors made entering the United States via Canada not only
an attractive option but a legal one for Chinese immigrants in the early 1880s. 4 An 1884 amendment to the Chinese
Exclusion Act made it clear that the reference to Chinese labourers applied to all Chinese, including those who arrived from
other countries or were subjects of countries other than China. 5 Once legal entry through Canada was no longer possible,
Chinese labourers took advantage of Canada's long and largely unmonitored land and water borders and further court
decisions in their favour to aid their illegal entry into the United States. Once they joined existing Chinese communities in
Seattle or in rural mining camps, they became virtually invisible to customs authorities who admitted they found it difficult to
distinguish between individuals of Chinese descent. 6 If an immigrant did happen to get caught while trying to enter the
United States illegally, he could easily try again. Most federal courts had ruled that the laws in force in the 1880s only
allowed inspectors to deport immigrants arriving from Canada to Canada, allowing a determined immigrant to be arrested
and deported repeatedly until he eventually succeeded.
In the early 1890s, Congress considered a number of solutions to curb illegal Chinese immigration. Senator Herman
Stump believed that a small cavalry force and some revenue cutters would be enough to deter and detect any Chinese
immigrants attempting to cross the border. In addition to increased manpower and better equipment, customs officials
suggested that excludable Chinese entrants should be sent directly back to China whether they arrived at a land or an
ocean port. Most officials believed that the best solution to the problem would be to encourage Canada to ban Chinese
labour outright. To that end, a concurrent resolution of the House and Senate called on President Grover Cleveland to
negotiate a treaty with Great Britain in which Canada would agree to prevent the illegal entry of Chinese immigrants across
its border with the United States. 7
The British government responded to America's request by stating that neither the Canadian nor the British government
felt it was in their best interests to impose further restrictions on Chinese migration. The Canadian government noted that
there were only around 6,000 Chinese-Canadians in 1891, so even if it were possible to effectively monitor the land and
water borders between the two countries there were simply too few people involved to make the effort worthwhile. A
Chinese immigrant who paid the $50 head tax Canada had implemented in 1885 was allowed, without exception, to apply
for a certificate of re-entry if he wanted to leave Canada and not have to pay the tax upon his return. In his dispatch to the
Secretary of the British Legation in Washington, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs noted Canada's objections
and added that the British government was not willing to suggest that Canada impose further restrictions on Chinese
immigration as China's government had strongly criticized the existing restrictions. Sir Julian Pauncefote, Britain's Minister to
Washington, informed Secretary of State John W. Foster that, while the British government encouraged further discussions,
the combination of British interests and Canadian geography were difficult obstacles to overcome. 8
Even before the British (and, indirectly, the Canadians) informed the Americans that they were unwilling to impose
further restrictions on Chinese immigration, Congress had shifted its focus from excluding Chinese immigrants at the border
to identifying and deporting illegal Chinese immigrants already in the United States. In addition to extending the exclusion of
Chinese labourers for another 10 years, the Geary Act of 1892 changed the normal presumption of innocence by stating
that any “Chinese person or person of Chinese descent” was assumed to be in the United States illegally until he or she
could demonstrate otherwise. By May 1893, all Chinese labourers who legally resided in the United States had to acquire a
certificate of residence, which in turn required at least one non-Chinese witness who could attest to prior residence, or face
deportation. Immigrant inspectors were given broad powers, including the right to search Chinese businesses and
residences without a warrant and to stop and detain any Chinese who, in their opinion, looked as if they had just crossed
the border. American officials believed that the enforcement measures in the Geary Act would curb Chinese fraud and
deter potential border crossers. 9
Despite the fact that Chinese labourers were not the only immigrants to evade American immigration inspectors, during
the 1880s Chinese immigrants received far more political attention in the United States than their European counterparts.
American officials believed that a European immigrant was a future American citizen, making even a diseased or
impoverished European immigrant more desirable than any Chinese immigrant. Those Europeans who arrived across the
land border in violation of the law were believed to be misguided victims of unscrupulous transportation agents in Europe
and not a reflection on the overall quality of European immigrants. Although only a minority of Chinese immigrants entered
the United States illegally, many Americans believed all Chinese immigrants were liars and cheats, a view reflected in
federal immigration legislation. 10
By the late 1880s, a growing number of Americans believed that more needed to be done to inspect non-Chinese
immigrants at America's seaports. While the federal government had authority over all aspects of immigration, the
Immigration Act of 1882 left the actual administration of immigration inspection to state immigration authorities.
Understaffing at the major ports of New York and Boston led to lax and hurried inspections of individual immigrants, which in
turn led to a small number of immigrants being denied entry. The Foran Act of 1885, which called for the deportation of any
immigrant to the United States who intended to fulfill a labour contract, proved even less enforceable. The few inspectors
who tried to enforce the contract labour law had to depend on the statements of the immigrants themselves, leading
employers and labour agencies to coach immigrants to ensure they were not screened out. 11
Congress believed that the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1891 would solve the various immigration enforcement
problems at America's seaports. The newly-created Bureau of Immigration was made responsible for operating the
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immigrant receiving stations at New York and at other American ocean ports, ending the collaboration between the federal
government and the state boards and commissions. Immigration inspectors were called upon to deny entry to the following:
persons likely to become a public charge, those suffering from “loathsome” or dangerous contagious diseases,
polygamists, and those who received some sort of financial assistance to pay for their passage. Any immigrant who
became a public charge or was found to have entered the United States in violation of the contract labour laws within one
year of arrival was deemed to have entered the United States illegally and could be deported. 12
Once the Immigration Act was passed, Congress confronted the problem of European immigration to the United States
via Canada. The 1891 report of the Select Committee on Immigration and Naturalization included testimony and statistics
showing that an alarming number of passengers landing at Canada's major seaports were United States-bound immigrants
who intended to evade American immigration inspectors. While the committee did not see any solution to the problem, they
did succeed in making European immigration to the United States via Canada a national issue. Congress also had to
consider the financial implications. In addition to the loss of business that American transportation companies would have
faced if a substantial number of passengers avoided American ports, Congress would have lost head tax revenue, funds
intended to cover the expenses of the Bureau of Immigration. 13
By 1893, a combination of diplomatic silence on the part of the Canadian government and provocative advertising by
Canada's transportation companies caused America's politicians to become even more concerned about the Canadian
border. On 6 January 1892 the United States government formally asked for permission to station its own immigration
inspectors at Canadian ports. While the Privy Council forwarded Consul-General Lay's letter to the Minister of Agriculture in
early 1892, he did not prepare a response before the Department of the Interior was made responsible for immigration
later that year. The Privy Council did not refer Lay's letter to the Department of the Interior until May 1893. In the
meantime, some Canadian transportation companies had begun to advertise the Canadian route as a way to completely
avoid United States immigration inspection. 14
In the fall of 1893, the Secretary of the Treasury decided to force the Canadian inspection issue. At the request of
Herman Stump, at that time Superintendent of Immigration for the United States, the vice-president of the CPR invited
Deputy Minister of the Interior Alexander M. Burgess to accompany them while they inspected Montreal's immigration
facilities. When they met on 31 August, Stump informed Burgess that the primary goal of his visit to Montreal was to reach
an agreement that would allow the United States to inspect American-bound immigrants as they left their ships in Canadian
ports. Other “objectionable features of the current arrangement” that the Secretary of the Treasury wanted to see
corrected included Canadian companies advertising the St. Lawrence route as a way for otherwise excludable European
immigrants to enter the United States. If no agreement could be reached with the transportation companies, the United
States was prepared to introduce regulations requiring all Canadian railways to introduce immigrant passengers to the
United States at only four or five points along the border or, if necessary, to require American inspectors to inspect all
passenger trains arriving from Canada. 15
Even before he consulted the transportation companies, Burgess realised that the proposed inspection regime would
cause serious problems for passengers travelling between Canada and the United States, which would in turn lead to
“friction and irritation” between the two nations. When he learned of the American proposal, Thomas Shaughnessy of the
CPR bleakly concluded that enforcement of the new regulations would “simply paralyze the carrying trade between Canada
and the United States.” On 1 September, Burgess met with representatives of four steamship companies based in Montreal
and the Grand Trunk and Canadian Pacific Railways. All of the transportation companies agreed that it would be in their
best interests to allow the Americans to place inspectors at Canadian ports. 16
Stump and the transportation companies signed an agreement, later known to the United States as the Canadian
Agreement, on 7 September 1893. The steamship companies agreed that immigrants bound for the United States would
only be allowed to land at certain ports (Halifax, Montreal, Quebec City, and Vancouver initially) where they would be
subject to inspection by United States immigrant inspectors before being allowed to board trains. The railway companies
agreed to not sell tickets to points in the United States to immigrants who did not produce a certificate of inspection. An
immigrant who presented his or her inspection certificate to a United States inspector at the border was not subject to any
further examination. All of the transportation companies agreed to be bound by the provisions of the Immigration Act,
meaning they were responsible for the cost of transporting any rejected immigrant back to their home country and for
collecting and forwarding the head tax for any immigrant who purchased a ticked to the United States. 17
In part due to the influence of the transportation companies, the government of Canada agreed to allow American
immigration inspectors to operate in Canada without officially acknowledging that the United States had any right to do so.
Burgess informed Stump on 11 September 1893 that T. Mayne Daly, Canada's Minister of the Interior, had rejected the
agreement “between the transportation companies and yourself.” 18 At a meeting with the transportation companies a few
days later, Prime Minister Sir John S. Thompson clarified Canada's position by stating that Daly had, in fact, only rejected a
second agreement in which the government of Canada would have allowed the Americans to conduct their inspections on
federal property. The Prime Minister allowed the core agreement to stand, which in turn allowed the Americans to send
immigration inspectors to Canada with the understanding that their presence would not be officially recognised. 19
The Canadian Agreement appeared to have much to offer to the governments of both countries. The United States was
given the power to extend its immigration policy and law enforcement to Canada's seaports which, in turn, allowed the
United States to hire far fewer inspectors than would have been necessary to monitor the land border. If the United States
could prove that an immigrant who accepted social assistance, was arrested, or carried a dangerous disease had arrived in
Canada on one of the signatory shipping lines, the Canadian company was responsible for the expense of deporting that
immigrant. 20 Unlike its earlier request concerning the Chinese, the United States was not asking Canada to change its laws
or to spend any money to help the Americans keep out unwanted immigrants. In fact, the Americans and the transportation
companies had found a solution to a potentially ugly diplomatic and economic problem that did not require the government
of Canada to do anything. When the Opposition requested copies of correspondence between the United States and
Canada (with the Imperial government added for good measure) allowing the presence of American inspectors at Quebec,
Daly could truthfully state that no such correspondence existed but that he was aware of an agreement between the United
States and certain transportation companies that allowed the Americans to inspect immigrants on steamships berthed at
Quebec, showing that he was aware of the situation but not directly responsible for it. 21
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Unfortunately for the Americans, the Canadian Agreement did not live up to its initial promise. Because the agreement
only applied to immigrants who declared that they were on their way to the United States, the simplest way to evade the
American inspectors was to claim Canada as their destination and pass Canada's limited inspection. As agreed, the
railroads only sold tickets to United States-bound immigrants who had a certificate of inspection, prompting immigrants to
buy tickets to communities near the international border where American inspection was lax (or non-existent) or to have a
third party buy tickets for them. 22 To counter this form of evasion, the United States negotiated an amendment to the
Canadian Agreement in May 1896 in which the transportation companies agreed to deport any immigrant who arrived at
one of the ports covered by the agreement (including Saint John and Victoria, added after 1893), did not obtain a certificate
of inspection, and was refused entry to the United States within thirty days of their arrival. 23
Some immigrants were able to take advantage of a second method of evasion, exchanging their ticket to the United
States for a ticket to a point within Canada. In April 1894, Edwin M. Clay, Canada's immigration agent at Halifax, informed
his superiors that the railways had allowed three immigrants who had been rejected by the United States for violating the
Foran Act to exchange their tickets for points within Canada. Burgess agreed with Clay's proposal to make the railways
submit any request to change a ticket for points in Canada for approval by a Canadian immigration agent, but wanted to
consult the CPR first. 24 The CPR's passenger agent at Montreal believed no action was needed. A passenger who was
refused a ticket because they had no inspection certificate was referred back to the steamship company, which refunded
that passenger for the inland portion of their ticket. At that point, “[h]aving money in his possession he can then purchase a
ticket to any point in Canada and having this money you cannot very well say that he had no money and would likely
become a public charge.” 25 Burgess did not issue new orders to Clay or the other agents, suggesting that he accepted the
CPR's justification. In spite of the government's belief that these immigrants would, in fact, settle in Canada, there was little
stopping them from making their way to the United States in the same way as other immigrants who declared their intention
to settle in Canada but then crossed the international border at the first opportunity.
The Americans were naturally unhappy that Canada allowed immigrants who had been rejected by the United States to
enter Canada and, potentially, proceed to the United States, accusing the government of turning the Canadian Agreement
into a farce. To forestall further trouble with the Americans, in June 1901 Deputy Minister of the Interior James A. Smart
informed Canada's immigration inspector at Quebec and the transportation companies that, from that point forward, the
steamship companies would have to deport any passenger who was rejected by the United States inspectors. Smart
concluded, “I think we will have to go on the principle that any settlers who are not good enough for the United States are
not good for Canada.” 26
Soon after Smart announced his decision, the differences between American and Canadian law concerning the
treatment of certain diseased immigrants forced Canada to amend its laws in order to honour American deportation orders.
The United States considered trachoma (an eye disease) and favus (a skin disease) as “loathsome and dangerous,”
meaning an immigrant afflicted with either disease had to be deported. While the Department of the Interior ordered the
steamship companies to take greater care to exclude immigrants with trachoma or favus in 1900, Canada's medical
authorities did not believe that either disease was enough of a threat to justify quarantine or deportation. Because there
was no provision in Canada's laws or regulations in effect in 1901 that allowed Canada to detain or deport immigrants who
had diseases that did not require quarantine, the Department of the Interior required new legislation. 27
A 1902 amendment to the Immigration Act allowed Cabinet to prohibit any diseased immigrant from landing in Canada
whether he or she intended to settle in Canada or “to pass through Canada to settle in some other country.” At the request
of the transportation companies, Cabinet was also authorized to allow diseased immigrants to land for short-term medical
treatment. Canada's immigration officers were granted the authority to apprehend any immigrant who either landed or left
hospital without the permission of the government. While Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton did not believe any penalty
provision was necessary, he accepted a Senate amendment that allowed the master or owner of a vessel to be fined up to
$1,000 for each diseased immigrant he either helped to evade medical inspection or refused to deport when ordered to do
so. 28
Although the United States welcomed the 1902 amendment as a long-overdue measure to strengthen immigration
enforcement at Canada's seaports, it had already begun to reinforce its inspection force along the international land border
to intercept immigrants who had, one way or another, evaded American immigration inspectors at their port of arrival. The
annual reports of the Bureau of Immigration from 1898 to 1900 suggested that the United States needed more inspectors
along its border with Canada if it hoped to intercept immigrants who evaded America's inspectors at Canada's seaports. 29
By 1901, Congress was also aware that customs collectors who were also called upon to enforce immigration laws
frequently neglected their immigration enforcement duties. The combination of inadequate enforcement at the international
border and widespread evasion of America's inspectors at Canadian seaports led the United States to appoint Robert
Watchorn as Special Immigration Inspector for Canada, in charge of the immigration inspectors at Canada's seaports and
along the land border from Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, to Eastport, Maine.
Between September 1901 and June 1902, Watchorn implemented several changes that resulted in a more effective
system of control along the portion of the international border under his jurisdiction. He appointed inspectors to monitor
ports of entry that had no immigration inspection, then ensured that all inspectors who reported to him enforced the law
consistently. In addition to their inspection work, Watchorn ordered the inspectors to patrol suspected smuggling points
along the border. A year into his appointment, Watchorn reported that 2,028 immigrants who had evaded seaport
inspection had been turned away at the land border and that nine smugglers had been arrested and prosecuted. 30
Even before he wrote his first official report, Watchorn quoted a series of alarming statistics to certain Montreal
newspapers and interested politicians in an effort to convince Canada to harmonize its immigration laws with those of the
United States. On 22 March 1902, three weeks before Sifton introduced the amendment to the Immigration Act, the
Montreal Star quoted Watchorn when it concluded that Canada had become a “dumping ground” for diseased immigrants.
31 When Sifton insisted that the allegations of the Star and other newspapers were false, Conservative Member of
Parliament Uriah Wilson read out a letter in the House of Commons in which Watchorn insisted that the United States had,
in fact, rejected a substantial number of diseased immigrants at the international border. Watchorn went on to conclude
that, by extrapolating from the number of immigrants who claimed Canada as their destination at a seaport but were
subsequently sent to Montreal for a certificate of inspection when they attempted to enter the United States, over half of
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the immigrants who Canada claimed as its own were, in fact, immigrants who intended to enter the United States.
Watchorn claimed that he did not intend to criticize the Canadian government yet concluded that the various restrictions the
United States had placed on immigration had led to a better a better class of American immigrant, making it in Canada's
best interests to implement a similar set of restrictions. 32 While Watchorn's protestations of political neutrality were as
dubious as his extrapolated statistics, several participants in the parliamentary debates believed the amendment did not go
far enough and stated that the time had come to completely revamp Canada's immigration laws to match the restrictions in
place in the United States. 33 Senator James Lougheed went even further when he suggested that Canada should not only
duplicate the immigration restrictions in effect in the United States but that “they should be mutually and reciprocally
enforced between the two countries,” 34 a precise summary of Watchorn's (and, to a large extent, America's) primary policy
objective.
Clifford Sifton was dismissive towards both Watchorn's figures and the idea that Canada needed to ban any immigrants
who were not destitute, carrying a disease, or guilty of a crime. According to Sifton, Watchorn needed to show his
government that he was a busy man in order to ensure that his position was preserved, adding “we may therefore look
constantly for indications in the press that [Watchorn and his staff] are extremely busy.” 35 To adopt the immigration policy
of the United States would have been entirely impractical since, in Sifton's assessment, the fundamental objective of
American immigration policy was to prevent overpopulation by keeping immigrants out, while Canada needed as many
immigrants as possible to populate the Prairies. Any further restrictions would have put Canada at a competitive
disadvantage relative to other nations, which would have, in turn, reduced the number of immigrants to Canada. 36 Sifton's
approach was therefore similar to that of American policymakers roughly three decades earlier.
While there was little prospect of Canada passing any further restrictive legislation directed at European immigrants
once the amendment of 1902 became law, two developments in 1903 led to a substantial reduction in the number of
Chinese immigrants entering the United States along its border with Canada. An agreement between the United States and
the CPR required the railway to confirm, to the best of its ability, that Chinese passengers who claimed to be eligible to
enter the United States were, in fact, entitled to do so and to deliver all United States-bound passengers under guard to
one of four designated ports along the Canadian border. While the CPR was anxious to protect its lucrative Pacific
steamship business, the American threat to close the entire border unless the agreement was signed convinced the CPR to
agree to the government's terms. Years of American lobbying and public pressure from within Canada combined to
convince the Canadian government to provide the second major development, an increase in Canada's Chinese head tax
from $100 to $500. While still not the near-total exclusion the Americans wanted, the cost of the new head tax was
prohibitive, leading not only to fewer illicit entries into the United States but to fewer Chinese immigrants to Canada in the
first place. 37
The goodwill Canada believed it had earned by allowing the CPR agreement of 1903 and, in particular, the Canadian
Agreement of 1893 to stand turned out to be of little use in the face of inflexible American laws. In early 1905, Canada's
Superintendent of Immigration learned that the Hamburg America steamship line was ending its direct service between
Hamburg and Halifax and, in addition, the government of Hungary was forcing all Hungarians who wished to emigrate to
North America to leave from Fiume on a steamship line that only connected to New York. Faced with a substantial diversion
of immigrants from Halifax to the United States, officials in the Department of the Interior decided Canada needed to station
an immigration officer in New York. 38 In addition to requesting permission to send an officer to New York, the Minister of
the Interior asked the Commissioner-General of Immigration to allow Canadian-bound immigrants who were diagnosed with
a disease to seek supervised hospital treatment in the same way Canada allowed American-bound immigrants to do so at
Canadian ports and to allow immigrants who were excludable for reasons other than disease but who had a through ticket
to Canada to continue to Canada under the supervision of Canadian officials. The Commissioner-General was willing to
allow Canada to establish a presence at New York and to treat a ticket to Canada as a sign of financial means but, despite
persistent requests from the Department of the Interior over several months, insisted that American law did not allow any
exceptions to the rule that diseased immigrants who were not American citizens had to be deported. In his view, only
diplomatic negotiations would result in a change to American law. 39
George Elliott, Canada's first inspector at New York, could do little after he arrived in New York in January 1906 except
create lists of Canadian-bound immigrants and perform (another) medical inspection for immigrants who stated they
intended to travel to Canada. Because all immigrants were subject to an American medical inspection and interview before
they were allowed to proceed to Elliott's office, immigrants to Canada who arrived in New York could be deported before
they even spoke to Elliott or the officers who joined him later. Despite their very limited jurisdiction, the passenger manifests
Elliott and the Canadian officers stationed at Boston, Portland, Baltimore and Philadelphia forwarded to Ottawa were
considered valuable tools for information purposes, particularly when a large group of immigrants was on its way to the
border, and for solid numbers to show Washington during future discussions. 40
By summer 1906, Canada had ended years of resistance to a more selective immigration policy and adopted American-
inspired legislation designed to restrict immigration at both the Canada-United States border and at Canada's seaports.
Frank Oliver, who was named Minister of the Interior in April 1905 following Clifford Sifton's resignation that February,
believed Sifton had placed economic interests ahead of the need to assimilate immigrants into Canadian society. Although
Oliver believed that Sifton deserved praise for implementing policies that attracted greater numbers of immigrants than his
predecessors, he also felt that Canada needed to follow the example of the United States and pay more attention to the
quality of its immigrants. 41 According to Oliver, the Immigration Act that became law in July 1906 gave Canada's
immigration authorities greater powers to deal with undesirable immigrants. In addition to paupers, criminals, and the
diseased, immigration officials at Canadian seaports and along Canada's border with the United States were expected to
prohibit epileptics, the insane, deaf-mutes, and the infirm, a very similar list to the list of excludable classes in the American
Immigration Act of 1903 (anarchists being the main category missing from Canada's list). As in the United States, an
immigrant who received public assistance, was convicted of a crime, or was treated in a hospital within two years of their
arrival could be deported. Unlike the United States, Canada's Cabinet could declare any group inadmissible through an
order-in-council, allowing the Department of the Interior to react quickly when a group of undesirable immigrants not
covered by existing law attempted to enter Canada. 42
The provisions of Canada's new immigration legislation had the potential to compensate for its weak indirect border
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controls with a strengthened inspection regime along Canada's land borders. However, the Immigration Act of 1906 was
passed during the peak of a decade-long economic boom, leading Oliver to suspend many of the new selective immigration
restrictions until the political and economic environment changed. Although the boom meant a number of industries,
particularly resource industries, wanted more unskilled immigrant labourers, the government of Canada was particularly
concerned with attracting the estimated 60,000 labourers required to build the National Transcontinental Railway. Under
significant pressure, Oliver agreed to allow the railways and other industries to use essentially any labour they wanted.
Oliver may have taken some comfort in the fact that, although a number of employers still hired labourers from Asia, during
its second railway boom most of Canada's immigrant labourers were from Europe.
As general unemployment grew during the sharp economic recession of 1907, the Opposition blamed the government's
lax immigration policy for increasing the number of unemployed immigrants living in Canada's urban slums. The altered
political climate allowed Oliver to both fully implement the provisions of the 1906 law and add new restrictions as the need
arose. By summer 1908, British immigrants whose passage had been paid for by charities or government agencies were
required to submit to an inspection by a Canadian immigration officer before they left Britain. In addition, immigrants who
did not have prearranged farm or domestic employment or family to support them had to have $50 cash if arriving during
the winter or $25 during the rest of the year. 43
By 1908, the United States had what it felt was a complete complement of border inspectors after six years of gradual
expansion of its direct border controls. Watchorn's success in strengthening the border inspection regime in eastern
Canada led immigrants to head west to Winnipeg, leading the United States in turn to place an inspector there in 1903.
Within six months, the Bureau of Immigration learned that immigrants were entering the United States through Montana
without being subject to inspection. As Marian Smith notes, between 1902 and 1908 the United States would place a new
immigration inspector at the land border only to discover that immigrants “simply moved farther west or to some other
unguarded point.” 44 In areas where there were a number of border communities along a given rail line that did not have
their own inspector, the United States arranged to interview rail passengers before they left their station, either at a
Canadian seaport (for passengers with tickets to communities between Fort Frances, Ontario, and Baudette, Minnesota,
for example) or at the railway station in Winnipeg (for passengers travelling between Winnipeg and Estevan,
Saskatchewan). 45
In addition to the strengthened direct border enforcement that was in place by 1908, the United States had also
persuaded every transportation company that carried immigrants across the border to sign the Canadian Agreement. As a
result, American immigrant inspectors were able to check every scheduled train and vessel that entered the United States
with the knowledge that any immigrant they ordered deported would become the financial responsibility of the
transportation companies. When necessary, the Bureau of Immigration only needed to threaten to thoroughly inspect every
passenger on a given carrier's line to convince that company to fully comply with the terms of the Canadian Agreement. 46
Once Canada was prepared to station its own corps of immigration inspectors along the international border, it did so
essentially all at once, avoiding the problems of evasion the United States had experienced but creating problems for
border communities. In March 1908, Cabinet called upon customs inspectors posted along the border to conduct
immigration inspections in addition to their regular duties and increased their salaries accordingly. 47 Two months later,
Commissioner-General Frank L. Sargent noted that communities along the border were being forced to care for immigrants
who had been denied entry to Canada. The authorities at Ellis Island informed Sargent that Canada's lone immigration
office in New York (Elliott) only examined the physical and mental health of immigrants, not other measures of their
suitability. Sargent therefore suggested that Canada should supplement its medical examination with another covering the
non-medical aspects of Canadian immigration law. Canada sent a second officer to assist Elliott a few months later. 48
In addition to codifying the various immigration-related orders-in-council Cabinet had passed since July 1906, one of the
explicit goals of the Immigration Act of 1910 was to ensure that immigrants who travelled to Canada via the United States
were subject to inspection. During the bill's first reading, Oliver pointed out that, although the 1906 law applied to
immigrants who crossed the frontier between Canada and the United States, it focused considerably more attention on
immigrants who landed at Canada's seaports than on those who landed in the United States before proceeding to Canada.
In Oliver's view, the new act would “clearly and definitely provide for the exclusion of undesirables who arrive in Canada by
rail or by road.” 49 Specifically, the final version of the new Immigration Act explicitly allowed Cabinet to impose the same
regulations on land-based modes of travel as were in effect for marine vessels, including mandatory passenger manifests,
medical inspection of immigrant passengers, and the right of immigration officers to stop and, if needed, detain trains and
other vehicles entering Canada. The government was also allowed to order the transportation companies to provide
buildings for the examination and detention of immigrants. Wherever possible, the new regulations were to be drawn up and
enforced in such a way “so as not to unnecessarily delay, impede, or annoy passengers in ordinary travel,” demonstrating
Canada's continued deference to the interests of the transportation companies. 50
The list of excludable immigrants under Canada's Immigration Act of 1910 was as extensive as that in place in the
United States, but included more flexibility with respect to both adding new restrictions and lifting the restrictions in individual
cases. When the bill was being discussed in the House of Commons, Oliver acknowledged that “we have taken advantage
of a good deal of the work that has been done in the drafting of the United States Act.” 51 In addition to the list of
excludable classes already in place, advocating the overthrow of a government or inciting a riot became deportable
offences in Canada, matching the prohibition against anarchists in the United States Immigration Act of 1903. As in the
1906 bill, Cabinet could prohibit any individual or class of immigrants through an order-in-council. Oliver also recognised that
there were cases where strong laws needed to be set aside, leading him to incorporate a section of Australian law that
allowed the minister responsible for immigration to issue a permit to an individual who would otherwise be excluded. 52
In a direct reversal of the situation in the 1890s, in June 1910 Canada discovered that a number of immigrants who
were rejected by Canadian immigration officials in New York were subsequently admitted to the United States. As the
United States had done at Canadian ports, by July 1910 Elliott and the officers reporting to him had begun issuing
inspection cards to eligible immigrants to save time when they reached the border. 53 Unlike the United States in the 1890s,
Canada had a number of inspectors stationed along the border who stood a reasonable chance of intercepting immigrants
who evaded inspection at a seaport.
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The similarities between excludable classes and border controls in Canada and the United States by 1910 made it
difficult for most immigrants to enter one country with the hope of easy entry into the other yet were still not strong enough
with respect to the Chinese according to the Americans. The number of Chinese immigrants arriving in Canada dropped for
several years after Canada increased its head tax in 1903, but by 1908 Chinese immigrants began to arrive in Canada in
increasing numbers, in no small part due to the willingness of employers to pay the tax then deduct it from a labourer's
wages. 54 If a Chinese immigrant to Canada subsequently entered the United States, Canada was still not obligated to
deport that immigrant if the United States demanded it. To counter this problem, the United States closed its land borders
to Chinese immigrants then routed them via Halifax to Boston to ensure that every Chinese immigrant who wanted to enter
the United States would be subject to American law at an American seaport. 55
Concerned as they were with drastically increasing the number of immigrants Canada received, Clifford Sifton and his
predecessors were unwilling to implement significantly restrictive policies that might have driven potential immigrants to
other countries. Despite American rhetoric to the contrary, Sifton did implement some of the controls the Americans
wanted, including the exclusion of criminals and the indigent, a prohibitive Chinese head tax, and the 1902 amendment that
allowed Canada to deport United States-bound immigrants. Until Sifton left office, however, the United States achieved
more by threatening Canada's transportation companies than it did through government-to-government negotiations. Frank
Oliver was convinced that Canada needed American-style immigration controls at both its seaports and along its border
with the United States well before he took office and quickly implemented them once Laurier allowed him to do so. The long
delay from the time the United States began pressuring Canada to harmonize its immigration laws and enforcement regime
until Oliver actually did so was decidedly inconvenient for the Americans. As it turned out, Canada was politically ready for
American-style border controls around the same time as the United States had shown what combination of immigration
policies and direct and indirect border enforcement were most effective. The long delay allowed Canada to quickly
implement a proven system rather than participate in over a decade of trial-and-error.
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